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Abstract
This paper makes three contributions to
the discussion on the applicability of Type
Theory with Records (TTR) to embodied
dialogue agents. First, it highlights the
problem of type assignment or judgements
in practical implementations which is re-
source intensive. Second, it presents a
judgement control mechanism, which con-
sists of grouping of types into clusters or
states by their thematic relations and selec-
tion of types following two mechanisms
inspired by the Load Theory of selective
attention and cognitive control (Lavie et
al., 2004), that addresses this problem.
Third, it presents a computational frame-
work, based on Bayesian inference, that
offers a basis for future practical exper-
imentation on the feasibility of the pro-
posed approach.
1 Type Theory with Records
One of the central challenges for multi-modal di-
alogue systems is information fusion or how such
a system can represent information from different
domains, compare it, compose it, and reason about
it. Typically, a situated agent will have to deal with
information that comes from its perceptual sensors
and will be represented as real-valued vectors and
conceptual categories (some of which correspond
to words in language) that are formed through cog-
nitive processes in the brain. When situated agents
are implemented practically one typically adopts
a layered approach starting at the scene geome-
try and finishing at the level of the agent’s knowl-
edge about the objects and their interactions (Krui-
jff et al., 2006). Although, this approach may be
good for practical reasons, for example there are
pre-existing systems which may be organised in a
⇤ Both authors contributed equally.
pipeline this way, this also assumes that represen-
tations and operations are distinct at each level and
one needs to design interfaces that would mediate
between these levels.
Type Theory with Records (TTR) (Cooper,
2005; Cooper, 2012; Cooper et al., 2015) provides
a theory of natural language semantics which
views meaning and reference assignment being in
the domain of an individual agent who can make
judgements about situations (or invariances in the
world) of being of types (written as a : T ). The
type inventory of an agent is not static but is con-
tinuously refined through agent’s interaction with
its physical environment and with other agents
through dialogue interaction which provides in-
stances and feedback on what strategies to adopt
to learn from these instances. The reason why
agent’s meaning representations or type invento-
ries converge to an approximately identical inven-
tory is that agents are situated in the identical or
sufficiently similar physical environment and have
grounded conversations with other agents; see for
example the work of (Steels and Belpaeme, 2005)
and (Larsson, 2013) for an approach in TTR. Hav-
ing the capability to adjust the type representations
they can adapt to new physical environments and
new conversational exchanges. Such view is not
novel to mobile robotics (Dissanayake et al., 2001)
nor to approaches to semantic and pragmatics of
dialogue (Clark, 1996), but it is novel to formal se-
mantics (Dowty et al., 1981; Blackburn and Bos,
2005) which represents important body of work on
how meaning is constructed compositionally and
reasoned about. Overall, we see TTR as a highly
fitting framework for modelling cognitive situated
agents as it connects perception and high level se-
mantics of natural language and vice versa.
The type system in TTR is rich in comparison to
that found in traditional formal semantics (entities,
truth values and function types constructed from
these and other function types). In addition types
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are used to model meaning in a proof-theoretic
way rather than constraining model theoretic in-
terpretation. Types in TTR can be either basic
types such as Ind or Real or record types. Record
types are represented as matrices containing label-
value pairs where labels are constants and values
can be either basic types, ptypes which act as type
constructors and record types. The corresponding
proof-objects of record types are records. These
may be thought of as iconic representations of
(Harnad, 1990) or sensory readings that an agent
perceives as sensory projections of objects or sit-
uations in the world. The example below shows a
judgement that a record (a matrix with = as a de-
limiter) containing a sensory reading is of a type
(with : as a delimiter). The traditional distinction
between symbolic and sub-symbolic knowledge is
not maintained in this framework as both can be
assigned appropriate types.24 a = ind26sr = [[34,24],[56,78]. . . ]
loc = [45,78,0.34]
35 :24 a : Indsr : list(list(Real))
loc : list(Real)
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An important notion of TTR is that types are in-
tensional which means that a given situation in the
world may be assigned more than one type. For
example, a sensory reading of a particular situa-
tion in the world involving spatial arrangement of
objects captured as records of types shown in the
previous example may be assigned several record
types of spatial relations simultaneously, for ex-
ample Left, Near, At, Behind, etc. Another im-
portant notion of TTR is sub-typing which allows
comparison of types. In addition to the type in the
previous example, let’s call it T1, the record can
also be assigned the following two types T2 and
T3 whereby the following sub-typing relation be-
tween them holds: T1 v T2 v T3 where v reads as










Thirdly, types may be component types of other
types, for example p(redicate)-type list(Real) is a
component of the larger record type shown above.
Finally, record types may also be dependent on
other record types. A record type representing a
geometric relation between two objects, for exam-
ple Left is dependent on at least two record types
shown in the previous example representing per-
ceptual objects. The notion of dependent types
is stronger than that of component types and is
related to representing linguistic meaning. With
missing information matching a component type
an agent could still judge (with some error) that a
situation is of that type whereas a judgement with-
out a previous judgement of the dependent type
would be impossible.
The rich type system of TTR and the relations
between types give us a lot of flexibility in mod-
elling natural language semantics in embodied di-
alogue agents. However, one practical problem
that an application of TTR faces is how such an
agent will cope with the an increasing number of
types that it continuously acquires through learn-
ing and assign them effectively to every new situ-
ation it encounters given that such agent has lim-
ited processing resources. Since each type assign-
ment involves a judgement (a probabilistic belief
that something is of a type T ) for each record of a
situation an agent having an inventory of n types
would make n judgements, a large proportion of
which would yield very low or even zero probabil-
ities as they will be irrelevant or very-little relevant
for the current perceptual and conversational con-
texts. This is because due to the regularities in the
world certain types would never be assigned or are
very unlikely to be assigned in certain contexts.
(Hough and Purver, 2014) present a model
where types are ordered in a lattice by v which
drives incremental type checking for the purposes
of resolution of incremental linguistic input or
output which in itself is a different task to ours.
The approach captures taxonomic or categorial
relations encoded in types. As humans do not
necessarily judge situations from most general to
most specific or vice versa, the benefit of reduc-
ing judgements following taxonomic organisation
of types would vary depending on the situation
judged. Such knowledge would allow exclusion of
judgements of sub-types of an incompatible type
but agent’s judgements could be further reduced if
it were primed what to expect in its current state
and its perceptual and conversational contexts by
its knowledge about the world and the linguistic
behaviour of its interlocutor captured in a model of
thematic relations, that is spatial, temporal, causal
or functional relations between individuals occur-
ing in the same situations (Lin and Murphy, 2001;
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Estes et al., 2011). Similarly, (Cooper, 2008) ar-
gue that agents organise their type inventory into
resources that are employed and modified in dif-
ferent activities. If this is so, in addition to a rea-
soning mechanism on subtype relations humans
must also rely on processes by which bundles of
types are primed for in particular situational con-
texts. As a consequence agents will not need to
check each situation (sensory reading in the form
of a record) for every type in their inventory but
only those that they are primed for. A property that
such priming mechanism must take into account is
that the more accurately an agent is primed by its
contexts, the lower the uncertainty and hence the
smaller the set of the types it is primed for.
In this paper we focus on the mechanisms that
drive the discovery of thematic relations and pro-
pose a computational model how such relations
are applied in interaction to prime an agent. The
basic premise of the paper is that the mechanisms
underpinning attention are fundamental to the con-
trol and priming of judgements in TTR. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce Load Theory of Attention. In
Section 3, we present an account, based on Load
Theory of Attention, of how two different kinds of
TTR judgements can be controlled and primed in
an agent. In Section 4, we introduce a mathemat-
ical framework that illustrates how an agent can
maintain probability distributions over its cogni-
tive states and types and use them in the priming
process. In Section 5 we give a worked example of
this framework priming an agent for judgements.
Section 6 gives some remarks about its usability
and presents our future work.
2 Load Theory of Attention
One of the major contributions of 20th century
psychology has been the study and improved un-
derstanding of perceptual attention in humans.
There is more than one type of attention mecha-
nism. In particular, a distinction can be made be-
tween bottom-up attention and top-down attention
processes. Bottom-up attention is automatic, task
independent, not under conscious control and is at-
tracted towards salient entities in the environment
(e.g., moving object, singleton red objects, etc.).
Top-down attention can be consciously directed
by an agent and is dependent on the task they are
carrying out as tasks will have different complex-
ities. Sometimes top-down attention is described
in terms of an agent being primed to respond to a
mental-set of perceptual stimuli that are relevant
to the task they are consciously carrying out.
Early research on attention was based on the
concept of a structural single channel bottleneck in
perceptual processing (Broadbent, 1958; Welford,
1967). The early orthodoxy of attention as a bot-
tleneck within a single channel has been chal-
lenged by several researchers (e.g., (Allport et al.,
1972)) and more recent models have viewed atten-
tion as a shared resource or capacity that can be
spread across multiple tasks simultaneously. For
example, in the (Kahneman, 1973) theory of at-
tention and effort the attention capacity can be fo-
cused on an individual task or shared across mul-
tiple tasks and the more difficult a task is the more
attention is required by that task. Furthermore, the
allocation of attention across tasks can be flexibly
updated as the agent changes their attention policy
from one moment to the next.
An enduring question within attention research
has been to understand the conditions under which
the perception of task irrelevant distractors is pre-
vented. Most of this research in the 60s, 70s, and
80s was framed in terms of the early-late debate
which focused on whether the structural bottle-
neck that excluded distractors occurred early or
late in perceptual processing. Some researchers
argued that attention could exclude early percep-
tual processing of distractors (e.g., (Treisman,
1969)) while others argued that distractor objects
were perceptually processed and attention only af-
fected post perceptual processing – such as work-
ing memory and response selection (e.g., (Duncan,
1980)). The reason for such a protracted debate
was that there was a lot of evidence to support both
views. Results from some studies indicated that
unattended information went unnoticed (support-
ing an early filter) and other studies indicated that
distractors were perceptually processed and inter-
fered with task response (supporting a late filter).
A well regarded recent model of attention is per-
ceptual load theory (Lavie et al., 2004). The con-
cept of perceptual load is difficult to define but can
be characterised in terms of the number of items
that are perceptually available (the more items, the
higher the load) and the demands of the percep-
tual task (e.g., selecting an object based on type
and colour is more demanding then selecting an
object based solely on type). Perceptual load also
involves defining what constitutes an item in a dis-
play: (Lavie et al., 2004) give the example that
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a string of letters can be considered one item (a
word) or several items (letters) depending on the
task. Perceptual load theory attempts to resolve
the early-late debate using a model of attention
that distinguishes between two mechanisms of se-
lective attention: perceptual selection and cogni-
tive control. Perceptual selection is a mechanism
that excludes the perception of task irrelevant dis-
tractors under situations of high perceptual load;
however, in situations of low perceptual load any
spare capacity will spill over to the perception of
distractor objects. The cognitive control mecha-
nism is an active process that reduces the interfer-
ence from perceived distractors on task response.
It does so by actively maintaining the processing
prioritisation of task relevant stimuli within the set
of perceived stimuli.
3 Load Theory and type judgements
Agents learn types all the time by making gen-
eralisations of invariances in the world and infor-
mation communicated to them through conversa-
tion (direct transferal of knowledge). However,
in order to access the knowledge quickly and ef-
ficiently, they organise it in a certain way in mem-
ory. We propose a method of how an agent (i) or-
ganises its type inventory in memory and (ii) ap-
plies this type inventory using a model of attention
that avoids the exponential problem of judgements
it would have to make without prioritising its type
checking. We turn to the second notion first, the
priming of type judgements using a model of at-
tention. Within this attention based account a dis-
tinction can be made between two types of judge-
ments: (i) pre-attentive and (ii) task induced and
context induced judgements.
3.1 Attention-driven judgements
Pre-attentive judgements are controlled by the per-
ceptual selection mechanism of Load Theory. The
result of a pre-attentive judgement is the introduc-
tion of a type into the working memory or infor-
mation state in a dialogue model (Ginzburg and
Ferna´ndez, 2010). Basic representations of visual
environment (Ullman, 1984) such as segmentation
of a visual scene into entities and background is an
example of a pre-attentive judgement. At the very
basic level these will be the iconic representations
captured by agent’s sensors (Harnad, 1990). Task
induced and context induced judgements require
conscious attention. As such, they are controlled
by the cognitive control mechanisms of Load The-
ory. These judgements are applied to types that
are in working memory and result in new types be-
ing introduced to working memory. Task induced
and context induced judgements are primed by the
types associated via memory with the current ac-
tivities that the agent is currently engaged in and
their physical location. For example, if an agent is
making a cup of tea there are a default set of ob-
jects relevant to that task that the agent will carry
out a visual search for and purposefully recognise
(the kettle, tea bags, cups, etc.). The definition of a
set of relevant types corresponding to these objects
can be understood as priming a set of task induced
judgements related to the recognition of these ob-
jects. Finally, context induced judgements can be
understood as task related judgements that are not
by default related with the task but that are exten-
sions to this set and are caused by the agent’s inter-
actions with other agents and the physical context
of the task. For example, while an agent is making
a cup of tea another agent warns them to take care
because the plate beside the kettle is very hot or the
agent may inadvertently touch the plate and sense
the heat on its own. The judgement relating to the
interpretation of the utterance “the plate beside the
kettle” or the sensing of and predicting the desired
reaction to a hot surface can be understood as a
context induced judgement. The utterance or the
hot plate is not a part of the task but is introduced
in the context in which the task is taking place.
This raises a question of what mechanisms
define these classes of type judgements. Pre-
attentive type judgements are the judgements that
are fundamental to the agent’s basic operation and
the agent is continually making them in order to
be able to cope with its internal states and the ex-
ternal environment. The types involved in these
judgements are intimately linked to agent’s biol-
ogy and embodiment as they are the types of ba-
sic representations generated by the sensors of the
agent. As such, there is a finite set of these types.
The assignment of other types is governed by the
attention model of Load Theory. Attention can
be either introduced by the task (or agent inter-
nally) or the context (agent externally). In terms
of knowledge representation there is no difference
between the types of the activity of tea making and
the types associated with handling of dangerously
hot objects. The set of task and context induced
types for which an agent is primed at any moment
28
is defined by current pre-attentive judgements and
the sequence of tasks and contexts the agent has
been engaged so far. For example, given that the
agent has previously been in the corridor coupled
with new pre-attentive judgements could prime the
agent to be attentive to types one typically judges
in a kitchen. An agent learns through experience
the types that are relevant in a particular task and
context. Practically, this amounts to finding as-
sociations between types in agent’s memory and
their evolution over time.
3.2 Cognitive states
Thematic relations are relations between objects,
events, people and other entities that co-occur or
interact together in space and time (Lin and Mur-
phy, 2001; Estes et al., 2011). Inspired by the
concept of a thematic relation we propose that an
agent’s type inventory is organised as a set of cog-
nitive states, where each state defines a set of types
that are related by a thematic relationship. A cog-
nitive state may be the cognitive correlate of the
agent intentionally performing a task but may also
be a non-explicit cognitive state of an agent gener-
ally being in a situation or having a disposition.
Importantly, we don’t believe that an agent has
conscious access to all its cognitive states nor can
all states be directly mapped to concrete activi-
ties. Rather a cognitive state can be understood
as a sensitivity towards certain types of objects,
events, and situations where this sensitivity map-
ping between states and entities has been learned
from experience. For example, there may be a
cognitive state associated with the agent’s basic
existence and its wish to continue existing, or of
being a parent, or of being in a concert hall, or
of being involved in a conversation about playing
a trumpet, or of making a cup of tea. The com-
monality across this disparate set is the fact that
it is possible to list a set of types that are relevant
to each state which represents agent’s resources in
terms of (Cooper, 2008). For example, the very
fact of an agent’s existence makes it sensitive to
entities in the environment that endanger it (large
things moving towards it at speed) or help its ex-
istence (food nearby). The cognitive state related
to being in a concert hall might prime the agent
to make judgements about the music, the instru-
ments and the conductor. The state of participating
in a conversation about playing a trumpet prime
judgements relating to the body language of your
interlocutor or the relationship you have with your
interlocutor (are they an experienced player or an
observer). Finally, the state of making tea could
prime an agent to make judgements relating to ket-
tles and cups and their arrangement in space.
It might appear that our approach simply pushes
the intractability of judgements over the set
of combinatorially exploding types onto the in-
tractability over a set of cognitive states. We ar-
gue, however, that not withstanding the apparent
complexity of human inner life there are in fact
relatively restricted number of cognitive states that
a human or an agent trying to live like a human
needs to maintain in the course of an average day.
While theoretically there could be as many states
as the number of type judgements discussed ear-
lier it is important to note that these states are built
by an agent bottom up when an agent discovers
new situations. Since an agent will be constrained
by the environment in which it operates and since
it can only discover a finite set of situations in its
life, and since it is equipped with learning mecha-
nisms with a strong bias to make generalisations it
will only build a subset of these states that can be
managed by its memory.
Important features of states and types include:
(a) an agent may be in several states at the same
time (they may be making tea and talking about
music), and (b) a type may be associated with
more then one state. While an agent is in a state or
states performing any additional type judgements
associated with one of the states incrementally re-
duces its ambiguity of being in several states.
4 A computational model
There are three requirements for our computa-
tional model: (i) agents clusters types according
to thematic relations into several states, (ii) types
are associated with each state with a certain proba-
bility, and (iii) a particular type may be associated
with more than one state. Thematic relations be-
tween types are expressed by the co-occurrence of
types in states. There are several computational
mechanisms that could be used to automatically
create states (clusters of types) with the above
properties from data. For example, all three re-
quirements are satisfied by Latent Dirichlet Allo-
cation (LDA) which is a popular approach to topic
modelling (Blei et al., 2003), the analogy between
topic modelling and our scenario being that a topic
is similar to a state and the association of a word
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with a topic is equivalent to the association of a
type with a state. A drawback with LDA is that
the number of topics or states must be known a pri-
ori. However, Hierarchical Dirichlet process (Teh
et al., 2006) is an extension of the LDA where the
number of topics is also learned.
Given that an agent has learned thematic rela-
tions between types in the form of their association
to states, the control problem which it is facing is
that it cannot know which state it is in and conse-
quently it cannot decide what is the optimal col-
lection of types to be primed for in making judge-
ments. As a result the agent must try to infer the
best sets of types to prime for by estimating:
1. a posterior distribution over the possible
states (and, updating this distribution as it
receives observations from the world and
makes judgements about the world)
2. make a decision regarding which judgements
to be primed to make based on the updated
probability distribution.
The posterior probability of being in a particular
state at time t is dependent on the previous states
at time t 1 (i.e., the Markov property holds: con-
ditioned on the present the future is independent
of the past), the task and context judgements the
agent has made following the priming in the pre-
vious t  n states where n is the length of history
an agent keeps, and the new pre-attentive judge-
ments which may reflect perceptual change in its
world. So, the posterior probability of each of the
cognitive states of the agent can be computed as
follows:
P(st |Pret ,Taskt 1,Contt 1,ASt 1) =
h⇥P(Pret ,Taskt 1,Contt 1,ASt 1|st)
⇥P(st)
where st is a state at time t, ASt 1 is the set of
active states1 at time t  1, Pret is the set of new
pre-attentive judgements the agent has just made,
Taskt 1 is the set of task relevant judgements the
agent has made following previous priming, and
Cont is the set of contextual judgements the agent
has made following previous priming, and h de-
notes a normalisation process that ensures that the
total probability mass of the posterior distribution
sums to 1. We argue that the probabilities on the
1We will define the set of active states later.
right hand side of this equation can be learned
from experience. This learning process can be
simplified if we assume conditional independence
between Pret , Taskt 1,Contt 1 and ASt 1 given st ,
essentially adopting the same formulation for cal-
culating poster probabilities as is used by a stan-
dard naive Bayes’ classifier:





Once we have computed a posterior probability
over the set of states an agent has we need a mech-
anism that explains how this distribution informs
the process of priming types. The simplest mech-
anism would be to select the state with the max-
imum a posteriori probability and then load into
working memory the set of types that are associ-
ated with this state. This approach has the advan-
tage of being computationally simple. However,
it has the disadvantage that the agent assumes that
they are only ever in one state, and, furthermore, if
two or more states have a high posterior probabil-
ity there is the possibility that the agent will keep
switching between these states from one moment
to the next. An alternative approach that is less
susceptible to switching between states is to:
1. use the posterior probability over the states to
rank and prune the state set, (the states that
are not pruned are the active states)
2. renormalise the probability distribution over
the set of active states,
3. compute a posterior probability over the set
of types associated with active states using a
Bayes optimal classifier,
4. using the posterior probability over types,
rank and prune the set of types and load the
set of unpruned types into working memory.
In order to rank and prune the state set we sim-
ply order the states based on their posterior proba-
bilities and remove all the states that have a prob-
ability below a predefined threshold. This rank
and pruning approach essentially implements a
process whereby an agent can recognise what is
not relevant to the current situation. Renormalis-
ing the probability distribution over the remaining
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states is a simple process of summing the probabil-
ity mass of the unpruned states and then dividing
the probability mass of each state by this sum. The
posterior probability of a type at time t is calcu-
lated using a Bayes optimal classifier as follows:






where typet denotes a type at time t, ASt de-
notes the set of unpruned (active) states at time
t, P(s|Pre,Task,Cont,ASt 1) denotes the proba-
bility of an active state s after the state set has
been pruned and the posterior probability over
the active states has been renormalised, and Pret ,
Taskt 1, Contt 1, and ASt 1 have the same mean-
ings as defined above. Using a Bayes’ optimal
approach to calculating the posterior distribution
over the types associated with the active states is
computationally expensive because it includes a
summation across the set of active states. How-
ever, the size of this set can be restricted based on
the pruning criteria used so the computational cost
of this summation operation can be minimised.
Some of the benefits, however, of using a Bayes’
optimal formulation are that: (a) this process ex-
plicitly recognises the fact that more then one
state may be active at one point, (b) it also recog-
nises the fact that a type may be associated with
more then one state and that the strength of as-
sociation between the type and a state is proba-
bilistic (P(type|s)), and (c) this formulation is ro-
bust to small variations in the posterior distribu-
tion over states (i.e., when the state with the maxi-
mum a posteriori probability changes the system
is stable—in terms of the types that are loaded
into memory—if the changes across the distribu-
tion are stable). Once the posterior distribution
over the types has been calculated the types can
be ranked and pruned in a similar fashion to the
states. This means that we need two thresholds
for pruning, one for pruning the states and one for
pruning the types. The ranking and pruning across
the states and the types both reflect the attention
based approach we have taken to this work mod-
elled by Load Theory. When the cognitive load
on the agent is low the pruning of states and types
can be relaxed and when the cognitive load from
the perceptual selection is high the pruning can be-
come more severe.
5 Worked example
In this section we present a worked example that
illustrates how an agent interacting in and mov-
ing around an environment can use the proposed
models to prime the set of types judgements it has
loaded in its memory. This example assumes that
the agent has already learned a number of types
and has already associated these types with the
cognitive states it has constructed over the course
of its lifetime.
To begin we will assume our agent has three
cognitive states: S1, S2, S3 and the prior proba-
bilities of these states are < 0.4,0.3,0.3> respec-
tively. Furthermore, the state transition matrix is a
right stochastic matrix with i rows and j columns
where each cell defines the probability of going
from state i to state j in one time step (i.e., each
cell defines P(S j|Si)) and is defined as follows:
S1 S2 S3
S1 0.7 0.2 0.1
S2 0.3 0.4 0.3
S3 0.1 0.2 0.7
We will assume that there are 3 different pre-
attentive types that the agent can assign to low-
level perceptual features. For labelling conve-
nience let us assume that these features are biased
to particular locations in a building so that we can
name these types after these locations, namely:
OFFICE, CORRIDOR, and KITCHEN (cf. semantic
labelling of places (Martı´nez Mozos et al., 2007)).
We will also assume that the agent knows three
task/contextual types2. We are interested in con-
structing agents that can participate in dialogues
so we have decided that these types include types
assigned to utterances in dialogue that the agent
can engage in; for example, this agent can take
part in dialogues relating to WEATHER, MACHINE-
LEARNING, or the general WELL-BEING of some-
one. According to our model the agent should
have learnt a probabilistic relationship between
each of these types and its own cognitive states.
The following right stochastic matrix defines the
probabilistic relationship between each of the pre-
attentive types and the state (i.e., each cell defines
P(type|Si)):
2For the purposes of the example the distinction between
task and contextual types is moot.
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OFFICE CORRIDOR KITCHEN
S1 0.7 0.2 0.1
S2 0.1 0.8 0.1
S3 0.05 0.15 0.8
And, the following matrix defines the probabilis-
tic relationships between each of the task/context
types and the states:
WEATHER MACH.-LEARN. WELL-BEING
S1 0.1 0.7 0.2
S2 0.4 0.1 0.5
S3 0.6 0.3 0.1
We also need to define two attention thresholds:
one threshold is used to define the set of active
states and the other is used to define the set of ac-
tive types. Unlike the probabilities defined above
(which are relatively fixed and are updated via a
separate learning process) these attention thresh-
olds may change from moment to moment and are
dependent on the cognitive load the agent is expe-
riencing: high load and the thresholds are low, low
load and the threshold are high. For this example,
we will assume that the agent is under a moder-
ately high load and that both of these thresholds
are set to: 0.3.
To begin calculating the set of types that the
agent is primed for at time step t we need informa-
tion relating to: (a) the set of active states at t 1
(ASt 1); (b) the set of task and context type judge-
ments the agent made at time t 1 (Tt 1); and, (c)
the set of pre-attentive judgements the agent has
just made at time t (Pret). For this example we
will assume the following: ASt 1 = {S1,S2,S3},
Tt 1 = {MACHINE-LEARNING,WEATHER}, and
Pret = {OFFICE,CORRIDOR}.
Our first step is to calculate the probability dis-
tribution over the states at time t. We do this us-
ing Equation 1. Before we apply Equation 1 we
need to calculate the probability distribution for
P(ASt 1|St). We can calculate these probabili-
ties using the prior probabilities for the states and
the transition matrix P(S j|Si) and applying Bayes’
Theorem. The resulting probabilities (rounded to
4 places) are as follows:
AS1t 1 AS2t 1 AS3t 1
S1t 0.7000 0.2250 0.0750
S2t 0.3077 0.4615 0.2308
S3t 0.1176 0.2647 0.6176
Once we have these probabilities it is a
relatively straightforward process to calculate
P(St |Pret ,Taskt 1,Contt 1,ASt 1) using Equa-
tion 1. One technical point is that for each factor
on the right hand-side of the equation (P(Pret |st),
P(Taskt 1|st), P(Contt 1|st) and P(ASt 1|st)) we
assume conditional independence between the
conditioned events given the evidence. For exam-
ple, for each Sit we calculate P(ASt 1|Sit) as:
P(ASt 1|Sit) = P(AS1t 1|Sit)
⇥P(AS2t 1|Sit)⇥P(AS3t 1|Sit)
In this context the posterior probability over the
states (rounded to 4 places of decimal) is:
P(St |Pret ,Taskt 1,Contt 1,ASt 1) =
< 0.5412,0.3677,0.0911>
Applying the attention threshold to this distribu-
tion over the states the set of active states at time
t is then {S1,S2} and renormalising the prob-
ability mass over these states gives us a proba-
bility distribution (again rounded to 4 places of
decimal) of < 0.5954,0.4046 >. We can now
use Equation 2 to calculate the posterior proba-
bilities over the task and contextual types. We
only do this calculation for types that are as-
sociated (i.e., P(type|ASi) > 0) with at least 1
of the active states. In this instance all three
of the task/context types (WEATHER, MACHINE-
LEARNING, and WELL-BEING) are associated
with at least 1 of the active states so we cal-
culate the posterior probability for all three of
these types. The posterior probabilities over the
types are < 0.2214,0.4573,0.3214 >. Applying
the type attention threshold of 0.3 to this distribu-
tion there are two types that are active MACHINE-
LEARNING, and WELL-BEING and the agent will
be primed to make judgements of these types at
time t.
In this example, we only pruned one of the
task/context types from the primed list. However,
as the number of types grows (remember that types
will represent concepts at different levels of ab-
straction) and the number of states also grows then
the number of types that are pruned will also grow.
6 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we present a computational mech-
anism for attention-driven type judgements in an
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interacting agent that is inspired by cognitive pro-
cesses in humans such as discovery of thematic
relations and sharing of cognitive resources be-
tween perceptual selection and cognitive control
as proposed in Load Theory. It is important to
note that the problem of multiple type assignments
or judgements is not exclusive to TTR but is a
general problem where a cognitive agent has to
make numerous classifications based on limited
computational resources. In robotics this task is
known as visual search (Sjo¨o¨, 2011; Kunze et al.,
2014). The proposed application of TTR allows us
to formulate a cognitively-inspired computational
model for visual search. The approach is also rel-
evant to computational modelling of situated di-
alogue. Being primed for particular types would
disambiguate interlocutors utterances based on the
previous type judgements and perceptual observa-
tions. In dialogue generation it allows priming of
the agent to particular topics and therefore can be
used for topic modelling of a dialogue system.
The model proposes that an agent has a set of
cognitive states that they have learned from past
experience. An agent may be in more than one
cognitive state at any one time. There are a set
of types associated with each cognitive state of
an agent. When a cognitive state is active (un-
pruned) an agent is primed to make judgements
relating to the types associated with the state. This
is why our account links judgement in TTR and
attention. The difficulty with this account is that
because more than one cognitive state is active at
any one time the agent must decide which of the
active cognitive states it should prime for observa-
tion. The solution is that the agent should maintain
a distribution over its cognitive states and prime
its observation relative to the types associated with
the cognitive states with high probability. Follow-
ing Load Theory the agent will actually perceive
as many of these primed types as it can before its
perceptual capacity is exhausted and it will then
select a subset of these primed types for further
cognitive processing.
In our forthcoming work we are working to-
wards a computational application of the model to
situated dialogue. We are particularly interested
in evaluating the benefits of an agent being primed
this way in comparison to when it has no prim-
ing at all. The model introduces several parame-
ters, for example the number of states, the num-
ber of types, the size of memory for pre-attentive
judgements and task and context related judge-
ments whose effects on system performance will
also be investigated.
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